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Abstract
This paper develops a formal model to study earnings manipulation.
It analyzes the effects of real earnings, auditor quality and at-risk incen-
tive on management’s earnings manipulation decision. It shows that the
management has the incentive to smooth corporate earnings even when the
employment contract is linear. It also demonstrates that adding the abil-
ity to manipulate earnings to the principal-agent model drastically changes
the management’s attitude towards risk. The management will become risk
seeking in the company’s earnings when cumulative earnings management
in previous periods is high, even if the management has a risk-averse utility
function.
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1 Introduction
The waves of accounting scandals from Enron, WorldCom to Pamalat since
2001 have shocked stock markets and caused huge losses to investors around
the world. Why does management manipulate earnings reports? How is
earnings manipulation affected by company’s performance, the auditor’s
quality and the at-risk incentive in the contract? And how does the ability
to manipulate earnings affect the company’s investment decisions, partic-
ularly the management’s attitude towards risk? This paper constructs a
formal model to study these issues.
The traditional theory of corporate governance (Jensen and Mecking
(1976), Holmstrom (1979)) centers on the principal-agent model. The cen-
tral idea is that because the shareholders cannot directly observe the effort
by the management, executive compensation is linked to corporate earn-
ings to give the management the incentive to exert efficient effort and align
their interests with the shareholders’. However, in reality, the shareholders
cannot observe real corporate earnings either. The executive compensation
contract is not linked to the real earnings but instead to reported earnings
in the financial statement prepared and released by the management. The
management can exploit this information asymmetry and has the incentive
and ability to manipulate reported information. Although there are mecha-
nisms such as auditors and boards of directors in the corporate governance
to prevent it from happening, the auditors and board of directors have their
own agency problems and may not exert enough effort to minimize the prob-
lem and guard the shareholders’ interests. Also, as argued by Tirole (1986),
directors and auditors may collude with the management to present false
financial reports. The accounting scandals cited above clearly indicates that
‘these mechanisms are far from adequate in preventing earnings manipula-
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tion.
In this paper, I formally model the earnings manipulation process. I as-
sume that the probability earnings manipulation being discovered increases
with cumulative historical accounting overstatement. Under quite general
conditions, I get several interesting results.
Firstly, management has the incentive to move corporate earnings from
periods of good performance to periods of bad performance. Because the
model assumes the executive compensation contract is linear, this suggests
that the existence of earnings smoothing does not depend on the non-
linearity of the contract.
Secondly, we identify two effects of an at-risk amount on earnings ma-
nipulation: ”incentive effect” and ”income effect”. ”Incentive effect” means
that higher at-risk amount implies higher return to earnings overstatement,
and hence more earnings manipulation. The sign of the ”income effect”
is ambiguous. When reported earnings are positive, higher at-risk amount
means higher income for the management. The management has more to
lose if caught for fraud. Unless management are extremely risk seeking, this
implies they will engage in less earnings manipulation. If the reported earn-
ings are negative, then vice versa, the income effect means the higher the at-
risk amount the higher earnings overstatement. Therefore, the relationship
between at-risk amount and earnings manipulation is ambiguous. However,
in the special case that the management is risk-neutral, the incentive effect
always dominates the income effect. High-power incentive contract will lead
to higher overstatement. This suggests that such contracts usually in the
form of stock options have some serious side effects.
Most importantly, this paper shows that the ability to manipulate earn-
ings reports can drastically change the management’s attitude towards risk.
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Even if management is very risk-averse in its own income, when the cumula-
tive earnings overstatement is high, the management will turn risk seeking
with respect to corporate earnings. As argued in the paper, because the
probability of an accounting scandal is bounded between 0 and 1, it is rea-
sonable to assume that asymptotically this probability is a concave function
of the cumulative accounting overstatement. Therefore the probability of
the accounting fraud not being discovered is a convex function asymptoti-
cally. Under quite general conditions, this convexity will dominate the risk-
aversion of the utility function. The management will prefer risky projects
and may pay huge risk premiums for very risky project with very low ex-
pected returns. The shareholders may be inflicted with huge losses by such
excessively risk-seeking behavior.
Almost all companies involved in accounting scandals since 2001 made
some apparently irrational decisions just before the scandals became public.
In the last 3 years of its existence, Enron invested $1 billion in information
technology for its trading activity which is almost worthless now. World-
Com and Global Grossing gambled by borrowing billions of dollars to lay
fiber-optic cable and selling the signal-carrying capacity to corporations.
Palamat engaged in complicated financial derivatives deals that resulted in
huge losses. Lev (2003) identifies these investment decisions as one of the
main social costs of these accounting scandals.
It is not easy to explain these investment decisions using traditional
principal-agent models. With very high previous accounting discrepancy,
the executives in these companies face a high probability of accounting scan-
dals. They have very strong incentives to exert maximum effort and try to
make up past earnings overstatement. We would expect these companies to
have a better than average performance. And because almost all of these
3
companies were very successful in the past, these investment decisions can-
not be entirely attributed to management incompetence. More naturally,
these investment decisions should be regarded as the results of risk-seeking
behavior by the management.
Literature Review
The literature on general corporate governance is directly relevant to this
paper. For surveys on general corporate governance literature, see Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) and Denis (2001). Murphy (1997) provides a comprehen-
sive survey on executive compensation.
There is a considerable empirical literature on earnings manipulation. It
studies the effects of accruals and various kinds of accounting loopholes on
earnings manipulation. The seminal paper in this area is Healy (1985) and
Healy and Wahlen (1999) provides a comprehensive survey.
There are few theoretical models of earnings manipulation. Healy (1985)
shows how non-linear contracts especially bonus plans can induce the man-
agement to smooth earnings. Stein (1989) shows that management has the
incentive to inflate current earnings and forsake good investments to boost
stock prices. Bergstresser and Philippon (2003) show how stock options
gives the management the incentive to overstate earnings.
On management’s attitude towards risk and its effect on investment de-
cision, Garen (1994) argues that when the shareholders’ investment is well-
diversified, shareholders are approximately risk-neutral. Because the man-
agement has its human capital tied to the company and therefore is risk-
averse, the management will make a more conservative investment choice
than the shareholders prefer. There is also a strand of literature concerning
how the management’s attitude towards risk can be affected by different
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factors. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) and Hermalin (1993) show how ca-
reer concern can make the management excessively risk-averse. Palomino
and Prat (2003) shows that for money managers a bonus contract can cause
either excessive or insufficient risk taking behavior.
The setup of the model consists of 3 periods. In period 1, with the
knowledge of previous accounting discrepancy, the management chooses a
project. In period 2, the outcome of the project materialises. The manage-
ment observes the real earnings and decides reported earnings. In period 3,
if the accounting fraud is discovered, management goes to prison. Other-
wise, managment receives compensation linearly linked to reported earnings.
The probability of such discovery increases with respect to the cumulative
accounting discrepancy.
2 Setting of the Model
In a principal-agent model, the shareholders hire management to run the
company and make investment decisions. The employment contract is ex-
ogenous to this model and we assume it is a linearly increasing function of
the company’s reported earnings denoted by x. Real earnings are denoted
by y, which is only observable to the management but cannot be observed
by the shareholders. We assume the payment contract is bx + s, where
0 < b < 1, where b denotes at-risk incentive of the contract and s the basic
salary. This contract can be either a performance plan explicitly linked to
reported earnings, or in the form of stock options. We denote the cumula-
tive earnings discrepancy carried forward from previous earnings report as
q. The reported earnings discrepancy in the current period is x − y, hence
the cumulative earnings discrepancy at the end of the period is x− y + q.
Although the shareholders cannot observe y, we assume there is proba-
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bility P (x− y + q) = 1− e−af(x−y+q) that the accounting fraud will be dis-
covered. This will either be due to the monitoring of auditors and boards of
directors, or the company simply running out of cash. The parameter a > 0
denotes the efficiency of the auditor’s work. We assume f(0) = 0, hence
P (0) = 0, which means if the cumulative earnings discrepancy is zero, the
probability of an accounting scandal is zero. We also assume f(+∞) = +∞,
so P (+∞) = 1, as the cumulative earnings discrepancy tends to positive in-
finity, the probability that it will be discovered is 1. f ′(t) > 0, if t > 0,
f ′(t) < 0 if t < 0. Therefore we assume f ′(0) = 0 to make f(·) differentiable
at 0. Asymptotically, we assume f ′(+∞) = ∞. Also, the probability P
satisfies the monotone hazard-rate property, which is equivalent to f ′′ > 0.
Finally f ′′ is continuous. Although we impose many restrictions on P , this
specification is still quite general. For example the Weibull distribution
1− P = e−a(x−y+q)2n , n ≥ 1 satisfies all the conditions.
If accounting fraud is discovered, the management will go to prison and
its utility level is 0. If no accounting fraud is discovered, the management
will get payment bx + s and utility ew(bx+s). The function w(·) is three-
times differentiable and we assume w′ > 0, which means utility increases
with respect to payment, and w′′ < 0. Because the management is risk-
neutral when w′′ = −(w′)2, risk-averse when w′′ < −(w′)2 and risk seeking
when w′′ > −(w′)2, the assumption w′′ < 0 means that the utility function of
the management can be risk-averse, risk-neutral or moderately risk seeking.
Furthermore, we assume w′(−∞) = +∞, w′(+∞) = 0.
The main job of the management is to choose between a risky project
Y and a safe project C. A risky project Y is characterized by a cumulative
distribution function F (y), which is the probability that the realized earnings
is less than or equal to y. The support of y is [y, y]. Because the preference
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of the management over different projects may not coincide with that of the
shareholders, potentially there is an agency problem.
Although management effort level does not enter the model directly,
the assumption b > 0 implicitly assumes that management needs to spend
some effort acquiring and analyzing the information of different projects,
which ensures that optimal b cannot be zero. Because the main concern
of the paper is not on the form of the optimal contract, but on earnings
manipulation decision and how it can affect project choice, we choose not
to model management effort level explicitly.
We place the order of events in this model into three periods. In period
1, with the knowledge of q, the management chooses the investment project.
In period 2 the project outcome materializes, management observes y, and
reports x to the shareholders. In period 3, with probability P (x−y+q) = 1−
e−af(x−y+q), the earnings manipulation will be discovered and management
gets utility 0. With probability 1−P (x−y+ q) = e−af(x−y+q), the earnings
manipulation will not be discovered. The management will receive payment
bx+ s , and get utility ew(bx+s).
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3 Earnings Manipulation Decision
In this section, we concentrate on period 2 and discuss what the manage-
ment’s choice of x will be when it observes y. To do this, we consider the
characteristics of the expected utility of management:
U = ew(bx+s)e−af(x−y+q) (1)
Differentiating it with respect to x, we get the first-order condition:
bw′(bx+ s)− af ′(x− y + q) = 0 (2)
Because we assume both and w′ and f ′ are continuous functions, the solution
to (2) always exists. And because w′′ < 0, f ′′ > 0, this solution is unique.
Therefore (2) defines a one-to-one relationship between x and y.
The second-order condition is:
d2U
dx2
= [bw′(bx+ s)− af ′(x− y + q)]2ew(bx+s)−af(x−y+q)
+[b2w′′(bx+ s)− af ′′(x− y + q)]ew(bx+s)−af(x−y+q)
= [b2w′′(bx+ s)− af ′′(x− y + q)]ew(bx+s)−af(x−y+q)
< 0
Hence, (2) defines the utility maximizing point.
Lemma 1 x− y + q > 0, and x > y when q = 0.
Proof By the first-order condition, af ′(x−y+q) = bw′(bx+s) > 0. Because
f ′ is a monotone increasing function and f ′(0) = 0, x− y + q > 0.
This lemma shows that the cumulative earnings manipulation is always
positive. It is interesting that at b = 0, x − y + q = 0. Therefore, earnings
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manipulation is the direct result of positive at-risk incentive and imperfect
monitoring mechanisms. When the previous cumulative earnings discrep-
ancy is zero, the management will always overstate the current earnings.
But when q is positive, it is possible for x to be less than y. How the size
and sign of earnings manipulation is affected by the values of y and q is
described in the next four lemmas.
Lemma 2 0 < dxdy < 1
Proof Differentiate (2) with respect to y,
b2w′′(bx+ s)
dx
dy
− af ′′(x− y + q)(dx
dy
− 1) = 0
Arrange it:
dx
dy
=
−af ′′(x− y + q)
b2w′′(bx+ s)− af ′′(x− y + q)
Hence, 0 < dxdy < 1.
This lemma shows that reported earnings increase with real earnings,
but do so at a slower rate. Rearranging the the expression of dxdy , we get
d(x−y)
dy =
d(x−y+q)
dy =
dx
dy − 1 < 0. Thus the amount of current earnings
manipulation decreases with respect to y. The intuition behind this is that
the higher the real earnings, the more the management have to lose if the
accounting fraud is found out. Unless the management’s utility function is
extremely risk seeking (which is ruled out by the assumption w′′ < 0), it
will become less inclined to take the risk. Empirically this lemma suggests
we should expect less earnings manipulation from companies that perform
well: and fraud is much more likely to occur in companies that are in deep
trouble. Rosner (2003) finds that firms facing bankruptcy are more likely
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to engage in fraudulent financial reporting, which is consistent with this
lemma’s prediction.
Lemma 3 −1 < dxdq < 0
Proof Differentiate (2) with respect to q,
b2w′′(bx+ s)
dx
dq
− af ′′(x− y + q)(dx
dq
+ 1) = 0
Arrange it:
dx
dq
=
af ′′(x− y + q)
b2w′′(bx+ s)− af ′′(x− y + q)
Hence, −1 < dxdq < 0.
The current earnings manipulation x−y is low if the cumulative earnings
discrepancy from previous periods is high. Later, Lemma 4 will show that
x − y turns negative as q increases. The management has the incentive
to make up previous overstatement and keep it from exploding. However,
d(x−y+q)
dq =
dx
dq + 1 > 0, which means high previous cumulative earnings
overstatement still implies high current cumulative earnings overstatement.
The next two Lemmas describe the asymptotic behavior of x and x−y+q,
when y or q tends to infinity. They are of some interest in themselves, but
are important to prove the theorems that follows.
Lemma 4 Let y be fixed, as q → +∞, x→ −∞ and x− y + q → +∞.
Proof We prove this lemma by contradiction. By Lemma 3, we know as q →
+∞, x will decrease, and x−y+q will increase. If x does not tend to negative
infinity, it is bounded from below. This means x− y + q and af ′(x− y + q)
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will tend to infinity and since w′′ < 0, bw′(bx + s) is bounded from above.
However, by (2), bw′(bx+ s) = af ′(x− y + q), this is a contradiction. So x
is not bounded from below, it will tend to negative infinity as q → +∞.
Because when x→ −∞, bw′(bx+s)→ +∞. By (2), af ′(x−y+q)→ +∞,
hence x− y + q → +∞.
Lemma 5 Let q be fixed, as y → +∞, x → +∞ and x − y + q → 0. As
y → −∞, x→ −∞ and x− y + q → +∞.
Proof This proof is very similar to that of Lemma 4. We prove it by
contradiction. By Lemma 2, we know as y → +∞, x will increase, and
x − y + q will decrease. If x does not tend to infinity, it is bounded from
above. This means x−y+ q and af ′(x−y+ q) will tend to negative infinity
and bw′(bx + s) is bounded from below. However, by (2), bw′(bx + s) =
af ′(x − y + q), this is a contradiction. So x is not bounded from above, it
will tend to infinity as y → +∞.
Because when x → +∞, bw′(bx + s) → 0. By (2), af ′(x − y + q) → 0,
hence x− y + q → 0.
When y → −∞, the proof is exactly the same and is omitted.
Lemmas 2-5 mean that x − y is negative when y and q are large but
positive when y and q are small. Therefore management will understate
earnings when the company’s real earnings and past overstatement are high,
and overstate earnings when the real earnings and past overstatement are
low. In other words, the management has the incentive to move earnings
from good periods to bad periods and engage in earnings smoothing. Pre-
vious studies on earnings smoothing (such as Healy (1985) and Oyer(1998))
attribute its cause to the non-linearity of the executive contract. However,
these 4 lemmas show that even with linear contracts, management still has
11
the incentive to smooth earnings.
Next we discuss how earnings manipulation is affected by other para-
meters of the model, such as the efficiency of the auditors and the at-risk
incentive of the contract.
Theorem 1 dxda < 0
Proof Differentiate (2) with respect to a,
b2w′′(bx+ s)
dx
da
− f ′(x− y + q)− af ′′(x− y + q)dx
da
= 0
Because x− y + q > 0 by Lemma 1, we get
dx
da
=
f ′(x− y + q)
b2w′′(bx+ s)− af ′′(x− y + q) < 0
Here a represents the efficiency of the work of the auditors and other
monitoring mechanisms. A large a means it is hard for the management to
manipulate earnings without being detected. Theorem 1 shows it leads to a
lower level of earnings manipulation.
Theorem 2 dxds < 0
Proof Differentiate (2) with respect to s,
bw′′(bx+ s) + b2w′′(bx+ s)
dx
ds
− af ′′(x− y + q)dx
ds
= 0
and arrange it,
dx
ds
=
bw′′(bx+ s)
af ′′(x− y + q)− b2w′′(bx+ s) < 0
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When the base salary increases, management risks more in manipulating
earnings, which leads to less earnings manipulation by the management.
The relationship between x, the reported earnings and b, the incentive
provided in the contract is more complicated. Differentiating (2) with re-
spect to b, we get
b2w′′(bx+ s)
dx
db
+ w′(bx+ s) + xw′′(bx+ s)− f ′′(x− y + q)dx
db
= 0
Upon rearrangement, we get Theorem 3,
Theorem 3
dx
db
=
−w′(bx+ s)
b2w′′(bx+ s)− af ′′(x− y + q) +
−bxw′′(bx+ s)
b2w′′(bx+ s)− af ′′(x− y + q) (3)
The sign of dxdb is ambiguous. The first term of (3), the ”incentive effect” is
always positive. It means the greater the at-risk incentive in the contract, the
greater the return to earnings manipulation, and the greater is the earnings
overstatement incentive. The second term, the ”‘income effect”, depends
on the sign of x. When x is positive, higher b means higher payment to
the management and less earnings manipulation. If x is negative, then vice
versa, the income effect is positive, and we get Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 dxdb > 0, if x < 0.
This corollary means that for companies making large losses, an increase
in at-risk incentive can lead to greater earnings manipulation. However,
the value of this corollary is limited, because the condition here is nega-
tive reported earnings instead of negative real earnings. In reality, Enron,
WorldCom claimed high reported earnings even while they made huge losses.
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The next two corollaries are more general.
Corollary 2 At b = 0, dxdb > 0.
Corollary 2 means that any movement from no at-risk incentive to pos-
itive at-risk incentive will lead to management earnings manipulation. So
b > 0 is the root cause of x− y + q > 0.
Corollary 3 If w(bx+ s) = ln(α(bx+ s)+β), α > 0, α(bx+ s)+β > 0 for
all feasible x and αs+ β > 0, then dxdb > 0.
Proof Substituting w(bx+ s) = ln(α(bx+ s) + β) into (3), we get
dx
db
= (
−α
α(bx+ s) + β
+
α2bx
[α(bx+ s) + β]2
)
1
b2w′′(bx+ s)− af ′′(x− y + q)
=
−α(αs+ β)
[α(bx+ s) + β]2(b2w′′(bx+ s)− af ′′(x− y + q))
> 0
If the management is risk-neutral, w(bx+s) will take the form ln(α(bx+
s) + β), and ew(bx+s) = α(bx + s) + β. The condition α(bx + s) + β > 0 is
to ensure w(bx + s) is well defined and the management’s utility is always
higher than zero (the utility level when the accounting fraud is discovered).
Therefore, this corollary means when the management is risk-neutral, the
incentive effect is always greater than the income effect of an increase in
variable payment. An increase in at-risk incentive b will always lead to
greater earnings manipulation.
In conclusion, the preceding discussion shows that there are serious side-
effects in giving management high-powered incentive contracts. The return
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from earnings manipulation will increase and lead to greater earnings over-
statement. The popularity of high-powered incentive contracts in the form
of stock options in late 1990s may be one of the most important causes of
the accounting scandals surfaced since 2000. Because our model does not
take into account the information asymmetry in the management’s action
and ability, these theorems do not mean high-powered incentive contracts
should be rejected. But it does suggest caution in adopting them.
Investment Decision
In this section, we turn from period 2 to period 1 and discuss how the ability
to manipulate earnings can affect the management’s investment choice.
If there is no possibility of earnings manipulation as in standard principal-
agent models, the utility of the management is u = ew(by+s). If w′′+(w′)2 <
0, that is to say the management is risk-averse as usually assumed, it will
prefer projects with high return and low risk. However, as we will show
below, if management can manipulate earnings, even though management’s
preference over expected returns does not change, their attitude towards
risk changes drastically.
Theorem 4 The management’s utility increases with respect to real earn-
ings, that is to say, dUdy > 0
Proof By the envelope theorem,
dU
dy
= af ′(x− y + q)ew(bx+s)−af(x−y+q)
And by Lemma 1, dUdy > 0.
15
Corollary 4 If project Y1 with cdf F (·) first-order stochastically dominates
project Y2 with cdf G(·), then:
∫
U(y)dF (y) ≥
∫
U(y)dG(y) (4)
That is to say, the management will prefer project Y1 to project Y2.
Proof Theorem 4 means U(y) is an increasing function in y. From the
definition of first-order stochastic dominance, we get (4).
Theorem 4 and Corollary 4 indicates the management’s attitude with
respect to expected returns does not change as a consequence of their ability
to manipulate earnings. They still prefer higher return projects to lower
return ones, and have no conflict with the interests of shareholders in this
respect.
We measure the level of the management’s risk attitude using Arrow-
Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (Arrow (1970), Pratt(1964)). At
y it is defined as:
rA(y) = −U
′′(y)
U ′(y)
The management is locally risk-neutral at y if rA(y) = 0, locally risk-
averse if rA(y) > 0, locally risk-seeking if rA(y) < 0. The certainty equiv-
alent of project Y with cdf F (·), denoted c(Y, u), is defined as the amount
of money for which the individual is indifferent between project Y and the
certain amount c(Y, u), where u is the utility function; that is,
u(c(Y, u)) =
∫ y
y
u(x)dF (x)
To complete the analysis, we need Pratt’s Theorem to study how changes
16
in rA(y) will affect project choice.
Lemma 6 Given two Bernoulli utility function u1(·) and u2(·),
1. rA(y, u2) > rA(y, u1), for all y.
2. c(F, u2) < c(F, u1) for any F (·)
are equivalent.
Proof See Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) p.191. and the Solution
Manual by Hara, Segal and Tadelis (1996)
Given that the management can manipulate earnings reports, because
U ′′ = (−af ′′(x−y+q) b
2w′′(bx+ s)
af ′′(x− y + q)− b2w′′(bx+ s)+[af
′(x−y+q)]2)ew(bx+s)−af(x−y+q)
absolute risk aversion takes the form:
rA(y) = −af ′(x−y+q)− f
′′(x− y + q)
f ′(x− y + q)
b2w′′(bx+ s)
af ′′(x− y + q)− b2w′′(bx+ s) (5)
The first term of rA(y) is negative, the second term is positive, so the
sign of rA(y) is undetermined. When x−y+q tends to infinity, f ′(x−y+q)
tends to infinity. Because b
2w′′(bx+s)
af ′′(x−y+q)−b2w′′(bx+s) is bounded between 0 and 1,
if f ′′(x−y+ q) does not increase too fast, the first term of (5) will dominate
the second term. rA(y) becomes negative. The following lemma formalize
the above discussion.
Assumption 1 limt→+∞
f ′′(t)
a[f ′(t)]2 < 1.
Let x − y + q = t, then the probability of an accounting scandal is
P (t) = 1 − e−af(t) and d2P
dt2
= (af ′′(t) − a2[f ′(t)]2)e−af(t). Therefore, As-
sumption 1 means P (t) is concave asymptotically. Since P (t) is bounded
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between 0 and 1, and increases in t, it cannot be asymptotically convex or
linear. Even in cases where Assumption 1 is not satisfied for all the points
of t, asymptotically P is still concave for most of the points. Therefore,
Assumption 1 is at least a reasonable approximation.
Since P is asymptotically concave, 1− P is asymptotically convex. The
utility function of the management is the product of a concave function
and a convex function. Because x is a function of y from an optimization
problem, Lemma 7 shows that the convexity of 1− P will dominate.
Lemma 7 Under Assumption 1, for every y, there always exists q∗1, such
that when q > q∗1, rA(y) < 0.
Proof By Lemma 3 and 4 we know that x−y+q is continuous and increasing
in q, and has the range (0,+∞). Therefore, rA(y) is continuous in q. As
q → +∞, x− y + q → +∞, f ′(x− y + q)→ +∞.
Because 0 < b
2w′′(bx∗+s)
af ′′(x∗−y∗+q)−b2w′′(bx∗+s) < 1
lim
q→+∞ rA(y) < limt→+∞(−af
′(t) +
f ′′(t)
f ′(t)
) = lim
t→+∞−af
′(t)(1− f
′′(t)
a[f ′(t)]2
) < 0
Therefore, there exists q∗1 such that when q ≥ q∗1, rA(y) < 0
We can regard Lemma 7 as a generalization of the ”gambling for res-
urrection” (Romer and Weingast (1991)) phenomenon. If the probability
of an accounting scandal is 1 after some threshold, as in the ”gambling for
resurrection” situation, P is concave at the threshold point. Therefore, the
argument that the management was risk-seeking for insured thrift industry
in 1980s really hinges on the concavity of P at the threshold point and can
be viewed as a special case of Lemma 7.
When q is high enough, management can be locally risk-seeking at any
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value of y. Because we assume the support of a project’s return is bounded,
when q is sufficiently high, the management will become risk-seeking at all
possible values of y.
Theorem 5 Under Assumption 1, for every risky project Y with cdf F (·),
there exists q∗2 such that when q > q∗2, c(Y, u(q)) > E(Y ). When facing a
choice between a safe project C with return c(Y, u(q))−  and a risky project
Y , the management will prefer Y , for any positive number .
Proof Let q∗2 = max(q∗1(y)|y ∈ [y, y]), where q∗1(y) is defined in the Lemma
7. Then if q ≥ q∗2, rA(y) < 0 for y ∈ [y, y]. Let u1(·) = u(q), u2(x) = x. Since
the utility function of u2(x) is risk-neutral, rA(u2) = 0, c(Y, u2) = E(Y ).
Therefore, by Pratt’s Theorem, c(Y, u(q)) > E(Y ) if q > q∗2.
By the definition of c(Y, u(q)), the management will prefer Y over C.
Because  can take very small values, Theorem 5 means that when q is
very high, it is possible for the management to choose a risky project over
a safe project even if the risky project’s expected return is less than the
safe return. Even if the shareholders’ investments are well diversified and
shareholders are risk-neutral, the management’s risk seeking behavior is still
undesirable. If the shareholders have a substantial amount of their wealth
invested in the company and are risk-averse, the risk seeking behavior is
extremely detrimental to their interests.
Next we study how the management’s risk-seeking behaviour will change
as previous accounting discrepancy increases, that is to say how rA(y) will
behave as q tends to infinity. Intuitively, the behavior of rA(y) depends on
the concavity of P and the curvature of U . We need stronger conditions on
them to study whether rA(y) will increase or decrease asymptotically.
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Assumption 2 f ′′′ exists and is continuous.
lim
t→+∞
f ′′′(t)
f ′(t)
≤ 0
.
Because the curvature of P (t) is d[d
2P/dt2
dP/dt ]/dt = −af ′′(t)− [f
′′
f ′ ]
2+ f
′′′(t)
f ′(t) ,
Assumption 2 is a sufficient condition to ensure the concavity of P (x−y+q)
increases as x − y + q increases asymptotically. Intuitively this means as q
increases, P (x−y+q) becomes more and more concave, and the management
becomes more and more risk-seeking.
Assumption 3 w′′′ exists and is continuous.
lim
t→−∞
w′′′(t)
w′(t)
< 2(
w′′
w′
)2
.
The absolute risk-aversion for the utility function ew() is −w′− w′′w′ . Dif-
ferentiating it, we get −w′′′w′ − w′′ + (w
′′
w′ )
2, as the risk-aversion of ew(bx+s)
does not increase as x decreases, if w
′′′
w′ ≤ −w′′ + (w
′′
w′ )
2. When the man-
agement is risk-averse, −w′′w′ < 1, and we have w
′′′
w′ < 2(
w′′
w′ )
2. Therefore,
Assumption 3 means risk-aversion of management with respect to income
does not increase as the income level falls.
Lemma 8 Under Assumption 1-3, For every y, there exists q∗3 such that
when q > q∗3,
drA(y)
dq < 0.
Proof If w
′′′
w′ < 2(
w′′
w′ )
2 and f
′′
a[f ′]2 < 1.
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drA(y)
dq
= (−af ′′ − [f
′′]2b2w′′
[f ′]2(b2w′′ − af ′′) +
f ′′′
f ′
[
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
2)(
dx
dq
+ 1)
−ab
3w′′′
f ′
[
f ′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
2dx
dq
= (−af ′′ − [f
′′]2b2w′′
[f ′]2(b2w′′ − af ′′) +
f ′′′
f ′
[
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
2)
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′
−(ab)
2w′′′
w′
[
f ′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
2 af
′′
b2w′′ − af ′′
< (−af ′′ − [f
′′]2b2w′′
[f ′]2(b2w′′ − af ′′) +
f ′′′
f ′
[
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
2)
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′
−[f
′′
f ′
]2[
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
2 2af
′′
b2w′′ − af ′′
= −af ′′ b
2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ − [
f ′′
f ′
]2
b2w′′ + af ′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ [
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
2 +
f ′′′
f ′
[
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
3
< −af ′′ b
2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ − af
′′ af ′′
b2w′′ − af ′′
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ +
f ′′′
f ′
[
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
3
< −af ′′[ b
2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
2 +
f ′′′
f ′
[
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
3
<
f ′′′
f ′
[
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
3
By Lemma 2 and 4, as q → +∞, x → −∞, x − y + q → +∞, af ′(x −
y + q)→ +∞. By Assumption 1-3,
lim
q→+∞
drA(y)
dq
< lim
t→+∞
f ′′′
f ′
[
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
3 ≤ 0
Therefore, there exists q∗3 such that when q > q∗3,
drA(y)
dq < 0.
Theorem 6 Under Assumption 1-3, for every project Y , there always exists
q∗4, such that when qA > qB > q∗4, c(Y, u(qA)) > c(Y, u(qB)).
If the management has to choose between a risky project Y and a safe
project C, and the return of C is c(Y,u(qA))+c(Y,u(qB))2 , it will prefer Y when
q = qA and the safe project, when q = qB.
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Proof Let q∗4 = max(q∗3(y)|y ∈ [y, y]), where q∗3(y) is the function defined
in the proof of Lemma 8. Then if qA > qB > q∗4, rA(y, qA) < rA(y, qB) for
all y ∈ [y, y]). By Pratt’s Theorem, c(Y, u(qA)) > c(Y, u(qB)).
Because c(Y, u(qB)) <
c(Y,u(qA))+c(Y,u(qB))
2 < c(Y, u(qA)), by definition,
the management will prefer the safe project if q = qB and the risky project
if q = qA.
Theorem 6 means when q is large, as it increases, the management be-
comes more and more inclined to choose the risky project even if its expected
return is well below the return of the safe project. The agency problem of
risk-seeking behavior becomes worse and worse. In real cases, Enron and
WorldCom made highly risky investments after they had greatly overstated
their earnings in late 1990s, even if the prospects of these projects were very
dubious. These investments caused colossal losses for the shareholders in
these companies.
Finally, we discuss the effects of auditor efficiency a on management’s
risk taking behavior. On the one hand, an increase in a will reduce x. By
Lemma 8, this means the utility function ew(bx+s)−af(x−y+q) is less convex
and the management becomes less risk-seeking. On the other hand, because
the curvature of P is d[d
2P/dt2
dP/dt ]/dt = limt→+∞−af ′′(t) − [f
′′
f ′ ]
2 + f
′′′(t)
f ′(t) , an
increase in a will increase the concavity of P . Therefore, the effect of a
on rA(y) is ambiguous. Theorem 7 shows that as long as the curvature of
P does not change too fast (for example, when 1 − P follows a Weibull
distribution), the second effect dominates and an increase in a will lead to
an increase in risk-seeking behavior.
Assumption 4 limt→+∞
f ′′(t)
f ′(t) = 0,
and limt→+∞
f ′′′(t)
f ′(t) ≥ 0
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Theorem 7 Under Assumption 3 and 4, let y and q be fixed, there exists
q∗5 such that when q ≥ q∗5, drA(y)da < 0.
Proof
drA(q)
da
= −f ′ + (f
′′)2(b2w′′)
f ′(af ′′ − b2w′′)2 + (−af
′′ +
[f ′′]2b2w′′
[f ′]2(af ′′ − b2w′′ − af ′′) +
f ′′′
f ′
[
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
2)
dx
da
−(ab)
2w′′′
w′
[
f ′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
2dx
da
By Assumption 3 and 4, and because dxda < 0,
lim
q→+∞
drA(q)
da
≤ lim
q→+∞−f
′ − af ′′dx
da
− 2(abw
′′)2
w′2
[
f ′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
2dx
da
= lim
q→+∞−f
′ − af ′′dx
da
− 2[f
′′
f ′
]2[
b2w′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ ]
2dx
da
≤ lim
q→+∞−f
′(1 +
af ′′
b2w′′ − af ′′ )
= lim
q→+∞−
b2w′′f ′
b2w′′ − af ′′
< 0
Therefore there exists q∗5, when q > q∗5,
drA(q)
da < 0.
Theorem 7 shows when q is large, it is possible that an increase in au-
ditor efficiency can exacerbate the agency problem of the management’s
risk-seeking behavior. Better auditing system may induce the management
to become more aggressive in his project choice. Paradoxically, the effort to
reduce earnings manipulation may mean an increase in its damage.
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4 Conclusion
This paper develops a formal model to study management’s earnings ma-
nipulation behavior and its effect on companies’ investment decisions. It
demonstrates that earnings manipulation is caused by positive at-risk incen-
tive and imperfect monitoring mechanisms. Management has the incentive
to move earnings from good periods to bad periods, which suggests earnings
smoothing does not depend on the non-linearity of the employment contract.
This paper also shows that in many plausible situations, an increase in
the at-risk amount will increase earnings manipulation by the management.
This implies at-risk incentive is more expensive than suggested by the stan-
dard principal-agent model. It also means we should be more cautious in
recommending high-powered executive compensation plan.
Furthermore, this paper shows the ability to manipulate earnings dras-
tically changes the management’s attitude towards risk. When earnings dis-
crepancy from previous period is high, the management will be excessively
risk seeking, and gamble very risky investment projects. Such recklessness
may result in huge losses to shareholders. Paradoxically, an increase in the
efficiency of the auditors’ work may make the management more risk-seeking
and exacerbate the agency problem.
In this paper, we assume the employment contract is exogenous and there
is no moral hazard problem in the management’s effort levels. One possible
direction for future research is to add management’s effort to the model. In
this case the principal has to deal with two moral hazard problems simulta-
neously. It is interesting to explore how the ability to manipulate earnings
can affect the form of the optimal contract, and empirically whether it can
explain the relatively low-powered executive compensation plan observed in
most industries.
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